[Document 1. Note: this document is incomplete. It comes from a paper by professors Edward D. Etherington and Joseph F. Brodley of Yale Law School.] PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS FOR RAISING THE BIRTH CONTROL ISSUE (Brodley - Etherington - Yale Law School) May 25, 1950 Raising the Issue in the Court Little chance of raising it directly--Injunction would be of little help, especially if it were wished to get case to Supreme Court--Declaratory judgment might be worth trying again, making sure that threat of State's Attorney was unequivocal-- New possibility is to raise issue by Mandamus--Non-profit corporation would apply to Secretary of State for charter, and bring mandamus when Secretary refused to grant charter--Doesn't appear to be executive discretion in granting such charter--Would not be corporate practice of medicine--Lack of good faith objection could be met--Most difficult problem would be meeting argument that legislature in its discretion chose not to license corporation of this sort, legal or illegal--But strong counter argument to this--Improbable that legislature would have intended this and not said so. With such large political reasons opposing the change of the Act in the Legislature, and with such grave legal doubts hovering over a referendum, it may be that the best chance of an alteration in the law is through the courts. Even the bare raising of the birth control issue in the courts represents a very ticklish question. There seems little chance of raising it directly. A citizen would not wish to suffer the sensationalism which might be attached to him were he to violate the law. This would be especially true of one who is sick, whose life is in danger--the very person who would be able to bring the strongest case. Similarly, a doctor, fearing the harm that might be done to his reputation, would be reluctant to participate as a defendent. A possible way around this difficulty would be to find a crusader of the Margaret Sanger ilk, who would perhaps welcome the martyrdom. She might set up a booth outside the State Attorney's office and make appointments for married women at her birth control clinic; or she might sell prophylactic kits marked "For prevention of disease." (This would force the Connecticut Court to meet the issue raised by the case of Commonwealth v. Corbett. in Massachusetts. But the best hopes of attach are by less direct methods: There are three possibilities here: injunction, declaratory judgment, mandamus. In the past the Connecticut Court has not, on this issue, been overly strict on procedural [Document 2.] REQUIREMENTS FOR A TEST CASE (firm of Wiggin & Dana) It is essential that: 1. She must have used contrceptives in this state in the recent past. 2. She must be willing to be a defendant in criminal proceedings against her. This means she would go through the form of arrest, but would be forthwith released on bail. 3. She must be willing to confess to the State's Attorney that she has used contraceptives and to so testify in open court. 4. She must be willing to risk the possibility that, if the case is ultimately decided against her, she might at that time be sentenced to not less than sixty days in jail. A jail sentence is unlikely, but it could be imposed. 5. She must have used contraceptives on the advice of a physician that a pregnancy within three years would be seriously detrimental to her health, or, possibly on the advice of a physician that if she became pregnant within three years, her child would be abnormal. 6. The physician must be willing to testify in court as to his opinion and advice. It would be desirable if: 7. She had procured her instruction in the use of contraceptives prior to March 6, 1940 or from an out-of-state doctor. 8. Her husband were willing to tell the State's Attorney that she had used contraceptives, and possibly to so testify in open court. 9. She already had one or more children. [Document 3. Memorandum from Hartford attorneys John H. Riege and Buist Anderson to the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, Inc., re: possible legal actions; 1955] MEMORANDUM To: Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, Inc. Re: Recommendations Concerning Possible Legal Actions. I. THE QUESTION You have asked us to make a study of the possible legal actions which might accomplish the objective of revoking or limiting the present Birth Control Law in Connecticut and to analyze the probability of success in each case, recommending a case or cases which, in our opinion, would offer the best chance of success. This study does not include in its scope other possible means of accomplishing this end, such as political action, nor does this study consider in detail the practical problems that may present themselves in certain of the cases; for example, obtaining an actual patient or patients as parties in these cases. II. THE STATUTES INVOLVED The Birth Control statute in Connecticut with which we are dealing is Section 8568 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, revision of 1949, which provides as follows: ``Any person who shall use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less that $50.00 or imprisoned not less than 60 days nor more than one year, or be both fined and imprisoned.'' In connection with the types of action we are recommending, we are also concerned with the following general provisions of the General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1949: ``Sec. 8875. Accessories. Any person who shall assist, abet, counsel, cause, hire or command another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.'' ``Sec. 8876. Conspiracy. Any person who shall combine, confederate or agree with another or others to accomplish any unlawful object by lawful means, or any lawful object by unlawful means, or an unlawful object by unlawful means, if one or more of such persons shall do any act in furtherance of such combine, confederation or agreement shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. No member or officer of any lawful organization shall be held liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents of such organization except upon proof of participation in or authorization of such acts or of the ratification thereof.'' III. BACKGROUND The present Birth Control Law was originally passed as part of a general obscenity law adopted by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1879. This law has since been broken down into sections of which the present Sections of which the present Section 8568 is one. There were no legal developments with respect to the Birth Control Law in Connecticut until 1939. During this period, however, the Federal Courts handed down a number of decisions which in effect said that the Federal Birth Control Law should not be interpreted to apply to doctors who prescribed contraceptives for health reasons. The Federal statute was quite similar to the Connecticut Law, particularly in that it did not specifically make any exception for prescriptions by doctors. In 1938 the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts Birth Control Law which prohibited generally the Sale of contraceptives. Gardner V. Massachusetts, 300 Mass. 372. The appeal from this case was dismissed by a unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court which simply said that no substantial federal question was involved. 305 U.S. 559. In 1939 the first legal action concerning this statute arose in Connecticut when two doctors and a nurse who were attached to the Waterbury Clinic were arrested for violating the Connecticut Birth Control statute, on the grounds that they were aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime under the present statute, Section 8875. Upon appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors the Court held that there was no implied exception in the Connecticut law which would permit a doctor to prescribe contraceptives for a patient in the absence of anything beyond danger to the general health of the patient, and further that the statute so interpreted was constitutional. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412 (1940). Judges Maltbie and Brown concurred in Judge Hinman's majority opinion, while Judges Avery and Jennings dissented. Because of a procedural technicality this case could not be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In 1942 the case of Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, was brought as a test case in the form of a declaratory judgment action. This case was designed to test the law in a situation where the patient's life was actually in danger. In another 3-2 decision the Supreme Court of Errors held that no exception of any kind could be read into the Connecticut Birth Control Law, even where life or serious injury to health was involved. Judges Maltbie and Brown concurred in Judge Ells' majority opinion, while Judges Avery and Jennings again dissented. This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the appeal was dismissed on the procedural issue that the doctor was not the proper party to raise the question of the patient's life or health. The court was careful to point out in its opinion that it was not considering the question of whether or not there was a genuine case or controversy such as is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court. 318 U.S. 44 (1942) Since 1942 an attempt has been made in each session of the legislature to modify or revoke the Birth Control Law. In spite of careful planning and the expenditure of considerable time and money, all of the proposed bills have been defeated or allowed to die in committee. In the face of this reaction the League has decided once again to consider the advisability of Court action. IV. OPINION In our opinion there are three types of cases which offer the greatest probability of accomplishing your purpose. They all involve a direct attack upon the constitutionality of the Birth Control Law and would all squarely present the issues to the courts. These action are, first, a criminal case involving the actual arrest of a doctor and named patients; secondly, a declaratory judgement action brought in the Connecticut courts by a doctor and named patients; and thirdly, an action by a doctor and named patients in the Federal District Court to enjoin the State's Attorney, the local prosecuting attorney and possibly the Attorney General from enforcing the Birth Control Law. (a) Criminal Action. There is little doubt that the criminal action would present your case most forcefully and would be the most difficult for the courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, to sidestep. The case could arise in any one of a variety of ways, and might, for example, result from the opening of a Birth Control Clinic by a doctor who offers birth control information only to patients whose lives would be endangered by pregnancy. A patient, or preferably patients, would be referred to the clinic by other doctors and the statute would subsequently be violated by the doctor and patients. At this point the local prosecuting officer would presumably step in, make the arrests, the defendants would be bound over to the Superior Court and the State's Attorney would enter the picture. A full trial should be had in the Superior Court, rather than moving the case up to the Supreme Court on reservations, so that all the necessary facts will be developed fully. As we will point out more fully later on, there is no accurate way of predicting the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. We must assume, therefore, that the case will be lost and appealed to the United States Supreme Court. It is our feeling that the United States Supreme Court should decide the case and that if they do so, the case would probably be won (See Section V. below). It is possible, perhaps even probable, however, that the Court would refuse to decide the case, dismissing it for lack of a substantial federal question, as was done in the earlier Massachusetts case (Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559, 1938). It does not seem to us that the Court could duck the case on the grounds of ``improper parties'', as in the Tileston Case, nor on the grounds that there was no real ``case or controversy'' but the ``federal question'' argument is a real possibility. To be sure, the Gardner case can be distinguished. In addition, the fact that the Tileston case was not dismissed for lack of a federal question, even though this was urged by State's Attorney Ullman in his statement against jurisdiction, can be said to indicate that the court recognized the presence of a federal question. We feel it is more likely that the court merely took the easiest way out and still has the ``federal question'' as ammunition to use should another case be submitted to them. Actually, in view of the character of the present United States Supreme Court, we cannot safely predict that the case would be decided by that Court although it is our opinion that there is a substantial federal question involved and also that all of the other prerequisites for jurisdiction would be present. Regardless of the above questions, however, we must hesitate to recommend this type of action because of the danger of prosecution of the parties under the Connecticut Conspiracy statute, particularly since we feel there is another possibility open to you. It is our opinion that the prosecution in this criminal case could be made under either or both of the Accessory and the Conspiracy laws. In Connecticut there is no merger of the Conspiracy charge in the crime once committed, and, in fact, it is recognized that the penalty under the Conspiracy statute may be greater than the penalty for the crime committed. We do not wish to overemphasize this danger, and if a doctor and patients an be found who are willing to assume whatever risk is involved, this type of case would still present your strongest argument. In a situation such as you are confronted with, however, where the statute has been interpreted by the highest state court in a decision which leaves little question as to what constitutes a violation, and where the State's Attorney may be under pressure to prosecute vigorously, we feel there is sufficient danger to all the parties involved in the case so that we cannot recommend the criminal action. (b) Declaratory Judgment Action. Although the Tileston case involved a declaratory judgment action and failed to evoke a decision from the United States Supreme Court, we do not feel this necessarily precludes the successful use of this type of action. If such a case is brought, both a doctor and named patients should bring the action. The strongest part of the case, in fact, would probably be built around the claims of the patients. The opportunity for the type of dismissal which occurred in the Tileston case would, we believe, be eliminated by thus joining the actual patients whose lives would be endangered by pregnancy. In this type of action, as in the criminal case, we must assume that the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors will decide against the doctor and patients. This is not to say that there is no possibility of a favorable decision in the Connecticut court. With the precedent established by the Nelson and Tileston cases, however, the present court would be reluctant to render an opinion which would overrule the earlier decisions. The power to overrule is used sparingly and the doctrine of stare decisis - the reliance on decisions in earlier cases - is an important one. It played, in fact a prominent part in Judge Ells' decision in the Tileston case. With the substantial change in the court personnel, however, which has occurred since 1942, there is more room for optimistic speculation as to the outcome of such proposed action and even though, as Judge Ells stated, ``a change in personnel of the court affords no grounds for reopening a question which has been authoritatively settled'' we do feel there is some slight chance of the present court overruling the Tileston decision. There is, of course, the possibility that the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors would decide that a declaratory judgment type of action is not the proper procedure to test the law. This possibility was in fact raised and left undecided in the Tileston case. It seems to us that all of the necessary elements for a declaratory judgment as established by the Connecticut Statute and Rules as well as prior cases could be present in such a case, but in view of the question raised by Judge Ells in the Tileston case, the possibility does exist that the court would hold that there is no ``actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties''. The possibility that the United States Supreme Court would duck the issues involved as presented in a declaratory judgment action, we believe, is somewhat greater than in the criminal action. There is the same possibility of side-stepping the case on the grounds that no substantial federal question in involved as in the criminal case. If the court believes the issues are similar enough to those raised in the Gardner case, and that their decisions in the four cases cited in the dismissal of that case constitute authority for such a dismissal, the court could again dismiss this action on that ground. (see Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27; Groves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 248; Lambert v. Kellowhey, 272 U.S. 581, 596.) In addition, there is the possibility that the United States Supreme Court would dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it does not involve a ``case or controversy'' such as is a prerequisite to the exercise of its jurisdiction. This possibility was definitely considered by the United States Supreme Court in dismissing the Tileston case when it stated that ``since the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that appellant has no standing to litigate the constitutional question which the record presents, it is unnecessary to consider whether the records show the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court''. 318U.S. 44, 46. This gratuitous statement may have had reference to the fact that the record indicated only that the State's Attorney ``claims or may claim'' that the actions of the doctor would constitute a violation of the law, and the Court may have felt this was more in the nature of a hypothetical question inasmuch as there was no actual threat that the State's Attorney would claim a violation. The declaratory judgment action has received rough treatment at the hands of the United States Supreme Court, and although the decisions of that court in these types of cases have been severely criticized, this attitude must still be recognised in assessing the possibilities of a decision in this particular action. The United States Supreme Court is particularly strict in its requirements when a constitutional question is involved, as would be the situation in this case. We believe the case could be arranged in such a way that all of the necessary elements would be present, including an actual threat of prosecution, but we also feel that it is impossible to be certain that the United States Supreme Court will not refuse to exercise jurisdiction in an arbitrary manner. It is our opinion, therefore, that although the declaratory judgment action is a safer way to test to the law than the criminal case, it offers the United States Supreme Court, and perhaps also the Connecticut courts, a greater opportunity to avoid rendering a decision. [Document 4. Letter from Hartford attorney Bruce W. Manternach, of Hartford's Robinson, Robinson & Cole, to Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut Inc. (Aug. 1, 1958)] Robinson, Robinson & Cole 750 Main Street Hartford, Connecticut August 1, 1958 Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut Connecticut, Inc. 48 Trumbull Street New Haven, Connecticut Gentlemen: Early in 1953 your organization, acting through Mrs. George P. Milmine and others in office at that time, retained us to bring an action in the Superior Court to test the constitutionality of the Connecticut Statute proscribing the dissemination of bith control information, Sections 8568 and 8875 of the General Statutes. After considerable study and discussion it was decided that we would proceed immediately when the League had found suitable persons to act as paries plaintiff. Efforts were made in this connection by your organization but you were unable to procure any suitable plaintiff who was willing to undergo the publicity attendant upon a court action. Efforts were continued and pending the results we withheld submission of our statement. We have now been informed through the newspapers that four plaintiffs have brought action in New Haven County, all for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of birth control law, from which we that our services are no longer required. Accordingly, we submit our statement herewith, the amount has been substantially reduced because of your status as a non-profit, public welfare organization. Sincerly yours, Bruce Manternach [Document 5. Letter from New York attorney Harriet Pilpel to Yale Law School Professor Fowler V. Harper, critiquing a brief (July 6, 1959)] GREENBAUM, WOLFF & ERNST 285 Madison Avenue New York 17, N.Y. July 6, 1959 Professor Fowler V. Harper Yale University Law School New Haven, Connecticut Dear Fowler: Thanks for your letter of June 18th. We shall be most interested to see the state's briefs and gather they have not yet arrived. And, of course, we continue to stand ready to help with the reply in any way we canst talk with you. Please let us know if there is anything further we can do at this time. So far as the Buxton brief is concerned, may I recapitulate and to some degree repeat what we have said at various previous times in conferences and letters. The thrust of attack in this case, the due process attack, must be grounded on the arbitrary and irrational impact of the law. This, we feel, calls first and foremose for a factual presentation, to establish the medical signifigance of availability of contraceptive advice for health purposes. If we were doing it, we would endeavor to make as impressive as possible a showing on this ground. We would precede this by reference to Butler v. Michigan, England v. Louisiana State Board, Consumers Union v. Walker, the federal contraception cases and others which create an appropriate frame of reference. Someof these cases are cited in the present brief, but they aren't argued or developed in such a way as to move the reader. It is imparitive, in our opinion, to use all possible case and factual material to prove the arbitrary impact of this law. In this connection, we think that you might also be able to bring in the malpractice point. I attach a copy of a memo on malpractice which we drafted in connection with the New York hospital birth control controversy. This material is adaptable, we think, to the purposes of the Buxton brief on the following principle: if failure to prescribe bith control in a proper case could subject a physican to malpractice charges in a state which does not forbid prescription of contraception, it is prima facie arbitrary for a state to forbid such presciption. -2- Professor Fowler V. Harper July 6, 1959 We have previously discussed the relevance of the community standards argument derived from Roth v. United States. This approach depends, on showing that notwithstanding the Tileston case, this statute does derive from the obscenity law. In any event, we think that the community standards concept can be brought in as one of the bases for the court's consideration of the factual material- support by medical opinion, religious groups, etc. The argument could be, in part, that where the most of society and most medical specialists concur, the foundation for legislative prohibition is dubious. The chief point we urge about the Buxton brief is the need for development of the argument - factually and case-wise - and for a full presentation in appropriate places. As to the ministers' complaints. We went over some of this when we talked but again I put it down as I remember it: 1. For the reasons we discussed, the inclusion or reference to specific texts would be helpful. I mentioned the Consumers Union pamphlet already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Hines book "Practical Birth Control Methods" already passed on by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, the Latz book on the "rythm" method, and the Fishbein and Burgess "Successful Marriage" which contains a detailed chapter by Dr. Abraham Stone. 2. We believe the distinction between advocacy and action which you and I discussed should be made clearly. The theory of freedom to advocate is distinct from the theory of freedom to act and rests on stronger foundations. We think it would be desirable to seperate these theories. The United States Supreme Court last Monday, June 29th, as you know, made clear the greater latitude allowed to advocacy than to action, stating in the "Lady Chatterley's Lover" case: "What New York has done, therefore, is it to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture advocates an idea - that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet the First Admendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty". Actually, I believe this case may have an important bearing on both the Buxton, and the patient cases also, and should be studied with this in mind as well. 3. It would be well to allege that plaintiff has in mind the counselling of particular parishoners, who stand in specific need of such advice. 4. For stated reasons, it might be - we think would be - possible to make more specific the principles of the various churches vis-a-vis contraception and family planning and it would be well to emphasize the religious basis of these principles. Reference should also be made to the Catholic position in favor of planned parenthood - its dissent being, of course, only on the ground of method. -3- Professor Fowler V. Harper July 6, 1959 5. We wonder why there is no reference to the Connecticut conctitution. With kindest regards to you as always. Yours, /s/ cs Harriet F. Pilpel P.S. I have been in touch on this matter with a lawyer member of the Executive Comittee of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. namely, Francis A. Goodhue, Jr., Esq., a member of a firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood and with a former Vice-President of the National organization, Fifield Workum, Esq., a member of the firm of Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett. They are both in accord with this letter and with the other recommendations we have made. [Document 6. Letter from Fifield Workum, of New York's Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, to Dr. William Vogt, of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, critiquing a brief (July 8, 1959)] (Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett) 120 Broadway, New York 5, N.Y. July 8, 1959 Dr. William Vogt, Planned Parenthood Federation, 501 Madison Avenue New York 22, N.Y. Dear Bill: Mrs. Pilpel sent me a copy of her letter of June 22 addressed to you and Mrs. Campbell, with which was enclosed a copy of the letter dated June 18 from Professor Fowler Harper to Mrs. Pilpel. I can sympathize with Miss Roraback's desire to be in complete charge of the Connecticut Legal proceedings. I am also glad to note that Mr. Harper reports her as welcoming suggestions from Mrs. Pilpel's office. I would expect this kind of cooperation to work out well, in the usual manner that counsel work together when they have clients with the same interests, to present the very best possible case. A couple of weeks ago, I went over the Buxton brief and felt that the presentation could and should be greatly strengthened in at least two respects. First, I would place much emphasis on the acceptance by the medical profession of birth control for health purposes. The reasons for this are that I believe that Courts are hesitant to strike down accepted medical views in construing a statute, and these views relate to the due process point. Second, I believe the brief would be much more persuasive if it explained why the principles in the Nelson, Tileston and Gardner cases whould not apply in the Buxton case or should be overruled. -2- Dr. William Vogt July 8, 1959 The end of last week, Mr. F.A. Goodhue, Jr. and I called on Mrs. Pilpel to exchange ideas. We discussed letters of April 16 to Mr. Harper and May 14 to Miss Roraback, and the draft of a further letter to Mr. Harper still be sent. I am much impressed with the validity of the points she raised in those letters, which in my opinion would greatly strengthened the legal presentation. I think that the Federation needs prompt advice from Miss Roraback as to whether these further points can and will be added in her case; also, what the status and time schedule are for the State's brief and the reply brief. It seems to me that it is unwise to run any risk by failing to prevent all the possible arguments to the State Court. If they are not added, I consider that the Federation may have no choice but to ask the Court's permission to file and amicus brief, because the successful outcome of the Connecticut actions, onced they were commenced, is so important to our cause in the rest of this country and abroad. Enclosed is a copy of this letter for Mrs. Campbell. I am sending a copy to Mrs. Pilpel. Mr. Goodhue has seen a draft. Sincerely yours, /s/ Fifield Workum (Enc.) [Document 7. Letter from New Haven attorney Catherine G. Roraback to John de J. Pemberton Jr., executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, discouraging national organizations' submission of amici briefs in Connecticut courts (April 22, 1963)] Catherine G. Roraback Attorney at Law 185 Church Street New Haven 10, CONN. April 22, 1963 John de J. Pemberton, Jr., Executive Director American Civil Liberties Union 156 Fifth Avenue New York 10, New York Dear Jack: This is in response to yours of April 15th, which I do not think quite corrctly states my position. As I attempted to express to you over the telephone, I do not think a brief from the CCCL would be a good idea in the Connecticut proceedings, if it is not filed by Connecticut counsel on behalf of Connecticut persons. If filed by non-Connecticutites, it would , in my opinion, have "at worst...a neutral effect", only if it were filed in connection and in conjuction with other briefs filed by local Connecticut grounds. On the other hand, I think that such a brief would have an adverse effect if filed alone, and/or, in conjunction with those of other national organizations. Thus the problem raised by the CCCL proposal would not be cured, in my opinion, by the filing of a brief by the National ACLU. Rather, it would only compound my reluctance to have a brief from a national organization such as CCCL, without a local organization taking such action. I know that my feelings in this matter are something of an enigma to those who have practiced in other jurisdictions. However, as I tried to express to you over the telephone, the filing of amicus briefs in the Connecticut Courts is not a very frequently used procedure, and, may I say also, the Court does not welcome them generally. I would hope that the CCCL would be interested in participating at the U.S. Supreme Court level, and I do hope that you can explore that for us. I fully expect that the case will end there, and not in Connecticut in any event, so that exploration of this possibility even at this seemingly premature moment would not be wasted effort. John de J. Pemberton Jr. -2- April 22, 1963 Since I assume you have discussed this with Harriet Pilpel, I am sending a copy of this letter to her for her information. Thank you again for all you have done in this regard. Sincerely yours, Catherine G. Roraback CGR/h CC: Harriet F. Pilpel, Attorney at Law Greenbaum, Wolff and Ernst 285 Madison Avenue New York 17, New York Mrs. Estelle T. Griswold, Executive Secretary Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut 406 Orange Street New Haven, Connecticut Professor Fowler V. Harper